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Abstract. Latin America has a long history of attempts to achieve regional integration, yet 
success has been modest. This paper contends that this is essentially due not so much to 
protectionist practices in the various countries, but to the lack of a common currency, or, at 
least, of a tightly managed exchange rate band. We reviewed the optimum currency area 
criteria that indicate it is prudent to increase economic integration before attempting to 
establish exchange rates coordination. Yet, we show that in the Mercosul there are already the 
minimal requirements to work on this direction. Diminishing exchange rate instability could 
encourage trade and investment flows across Latin American economies. We also performed a 
simplified exercise to understand how feasible would be the efforts to achieve exchange rate 
parity stability in the two larger economies in the region (Brazil and Argentina) and step 
forward toward adopting a common currency. 
Sumário. A América Latina tem uma longa história de tentativas de alcançar uma integração 
regional, embora seu sucesso tenha sido modesto. Este trabalho procura mostrar que isso 
essencialmente ocorre não tanto pelas práticas protecionistas nos vários países, mas devido à 
falta de uma moeda comum, ou, pelo menos, de uma taxa de câmbio rigorosamente 
administrada. Os autores analisaram o critério da área ótima de moeda que mostra ser prudente 
aumentar a integração econômica antes de tentar implementar a coordenação das taxas de 
câmbio. Entretanto, nós mostramos que no Mercosul já existem as condições mínimas para 
começar a trabalhar nessa direção. A diminuição da instabilidade cambial pode encorajar a 
entrada de investimentos e o comércio nas economias latino-americanas. Os autores também 
desenvolveram um exercício simplificado para entender como poderia ser viável alcançar 
estabilidade da taxa de câmbio em nos dois maiores países da região (Brasil e Argentina) e 
avançar na adoção de uma moeda comum. 
Key-words: exchange rate   common currency   parity   Mercosur  
Palavras-chave: taxa de câmbio   moeda comum   paridade   Mercosul  
JEL Classification: F33, F31, F15, F42 
I- INTRODUCTION 
Latin America has a long history of attempts to achieve regional integration, yet success 
has been modest. The only experience that may be credited a certain success is the 
Mercosur, but it is limited. This paper contends that this is essentially due not so much 
to protectionist practices in the various countries, but to the absence of a common 
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exchange rate, or, in other words, the lack of a common currency, or, at least, of a 
tightly managed exchange rate band. For instance, to illustrate simply with trade 
integration of two countries, if in one country a good is protected with a 25% tariff, and 
its currency appreciates 20%, the effective tariff will be zero, taking into consideration 
the exchange rate variation. Thus, the huge relative instability of the various exchange 
rates makes tariffs meaningless and represents a major obstacle to increased trade within 
the region. The goal of a common currency seems to many too demanding to achieve 
and thus distant, but this paper argues that it would not be so difficult to reach an 
agreement on this subject. This could begin with agreement on a band that, after few 
years, would evolve into adoption of a common currency. Our assumption is that, in 
economic engineering problems such as economic integration, there are times when one 
must either chance a leap ahead or concede defeat and fall back. If the leap ahead is not 
as difficult as most imagine, it will be the obvious alternative to follow. 
To discuss this problem we divide this paper in three main sessions. In the next session, 
we will present some selected stylized facts that could be helpful in understanding the 
suitability of the adoption of an exchange rate fluctuation band as a step forward 
towards a common regional currency. As we show there is a clear correlation not only 
between relative appreciations and trade-balance deficits or surpluses, but also between 
exchange rate instability and trade volume. We review past discussions of the subject in 
the region, and we discuss the necessary conditions for the establishment of a monetary 
band and its subsequently evolution into a common currency. The third section 
concentrates on the exchange rate arrangements in most LA economies, and we will 
show that after a long history of divergence, the economies converged to allowing 
floating exchange rates. In section four we will discuss how to arrive at the basic 
exchange rates that would provide the basis for the new currency, and how countries 
should manage their exchange rates to keep them within the band while the new 
currency is not actually created. Also in this section, we offer a discussion in broad 
strokes of the realistic and viable characteristics of a common currency, and of how the 
problems that might arise from it should be confronted and possibly resolved.  
Throughout this paper, we support the idea that common currency can encourage 
economic integration, which is converse to the recommended policy of the conventional   3
optimal currency area approach. We are suggesting that in line with the experience in 
the European Union, because monetary and fiscal policies have also been much more 
credible and because of the region’s converging exchange rate arrangements.   
II - WOULD MERCOSUR ECONOMIES ADOPT A COMMON CURRENCY? 
STYLIZED FACTS 
The balance of advantages and disadvantages of each exchange rate regime can be 
translated into Robert Mundell´s criteria for an Optimum Currency Area (OCA), as 
adapted by textbook discussions about the convenience of pegging local currencies 
versus letting them float. As the degree of economic integration with the rest of the 
world increases, so do the benefits of fixed exchange rates, whereas the advantages of 
flexible exchange rates tend to fall. This happens because of: larger potential gains in 
terms of lower transaction costs and currency risks; higher inflationary credibility and 
heavier weight of nominal anchor via hard pegs; and lower losses derived from the loss 
of monetary policy. According to this approach, full capital mobility implies that 
markets avail themselves of arbitrage or speculative opportunities whenever there is 
some misalignment between active monetary and exchange-rate policies. Therefore, one 
of these has to be given up, i.e. one policy has to follow the other.  
As in Frankel (1999), it is possible to have something like "half" monetary 
independence and "half" discretionary exchange-rate policy. Bresser-Pereira (2004), in 
turn, rejects the “fix or float” or bipolar alternative, and says that the realistic option is 
to “manage” the exchange rate within the context a floating regime. As long as 
boundaries of coherence (alignment) among policy instruments and targets continue to 
be respected, a mix of monetary and exchange-rate policies can be (softly or loosely) 
pursued. Until 1999, Chile combined its inflation targeting (IT) monetary regime with 
broad exchange-rate bands. Most countries do not hesitate to manage or influence their 
exchange rate while keeping it floating. The “dirty float” concept is just a biased 
valorative concept (“dirty”) to designate a common practice.  
The main drawback in the conventional wisdom of most analyses on exchange rate 
regimes relative to the adoption of a common currency originates in the narrow cost-
benefit analysis. In Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), if the degree of factor   4
mobility between regions within a country or between countries is low, monetary union 
is undesirable. Economies with diversified industrial and export structures are expected 
to reap the benefits of a fixed exchange rate. Such criteria for the adoption of a common 
currency may be conflicting, since a country may present an open economy, suggesting 
joining a monetary union, but it may at the same time lack internationally mobile labor 
or productive diversification. Conventional wisdom comes out with formal models 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994) that offer a theory of the optimum currency area 
based on maximizing the net benefits of a common currency
1. 
In line with the conventional wisdom inspired in the OCA theory, De Grauwe (2005) 
lists three different factors that determine whether a monetary union would be a suitable 
alternative currency strategy. These are: 1. the degree of economic integration between 
the prospective members of the union; 2. the degree to which these countries’ 
economies are subject to asymmetric shocks; and 3, the degree of flexibility in the labor 
markets. Hochreiter et al. (2002) also adds another, that is, a sound financial sector as a 
precondition. Berg et al. (2002) emphasize the co-movement of the economic variables 
assessed according to a well known Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology. In this 
case, “To assess the desirability and feasibility of a common currency, supply shocks 
are clearly more relevant, as one might expect demand shocks (…) to become more 
correlated under a common currency”(Berg et all, 2002:7).  Calderon et al. (2002), and 
Larrain and Tavares (2005) made similar remarks, and indicate that the degree of 
synchronization of output movements is quite low in the region. De Grauwe (2005) also 
points out the lack of credibility of the institutions as an additional reason why such a 
monetary strategy is unlikely to be embraced soon.  
Edwards (2006) showed that the prerequisites for joining a currency union have 
increased significantly. According to him, these may include the following in addition 
to those discussed above: different (or diversified) composition of output and trade 
across countries; price and wage flexibility across members of the union; similar 
inflation rates across countries; absence of “fiscal dominance” in the individual 
countries; and low, and similar, levels of public-sector debt in the different countries. 
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The only conclusion of these works is that a common currency in Latin American 
economies, including the Mercosur, is remarkably undesirable. There is no sufficient 
degree of economic integration, either trade or financial; even their business cycles are 
not intra-regionally coordinated. The economies are far more susceptible to 
international (out-of-region) financial and economic shocks. Generally, the authors 
come out with comprehensive data to show that European Zone has a higher level of 
economic integration; but they use current data, and the Euro Zone was notoriously less 
integrated than it currently is. Before the adoption of the euro, predictions that it would 
be a failure were common in the specialized literature on the subject.  
According to this same conventional economic literature, Latin-American economies 
had only two relevant choices in the matter of currency arrangement: fully dollarize or 
fully float. Dollarization was particularly suited to small economies with poor 
institutional records (such as Ecuador, Panama, and El Salvador), so that small and 
troubled economies might embrace the US Dollar and borrow the credibility of the 
North America monetary policies. Dollarization would work as a kind of shortcut to 
faster development of strong institutions. As in Berg et al. (2005), “Latin American 
countries would benefit from dollarization”. By accepting the US Dollar as means of 
payment they also import the monetary stability provided by the US Federal Reserve. 
Nothing is said about the fact that by dollarizing the country is relinquishes control over 
the most strategic of macroeconomic prices – the exchange rate. Alternatively, bigger 
economies like Brazil and Argentina should combine flexible exchange rates and 
inflation targeting regimes. Fluctuations would indicate the surrender to the “fear of 
floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) – an expression heavily burdened of normative 
content.  
Some authors assert that dollarization has the advantage of encouraging greater 
economic integration with the United Stated. We simply do not understand why a 
similar advantage is not present in the alternative policy of exchange rate coordination 
within the Mercosur. This aside, it is import to note that authors actually recognize that 
a monetary union provides benefits after adoption, but others reject the possibility as in 
Berg et al. (2002: 13), who stress: “As far as trade is concerned, there is some evidence 
that the use of a common currency is a factor that encourages bilateral trade among   6
countries that share a currency”. This is an important point. According to the OCA 
theory, countries would only consider a common currency if they showed high levels of 
economic integration; however, there is reason to believe that exchange rate 
coordination and a step forward in the direction of a common currency could encourage 
economic integration inside the region.  
Most importantly, an avenue of literature has shown that the criteria listed above as 
prerequisites for belonging to a currency union are endogenous to the monetary and 
exchange rate regimes (Frankel and Rose, 1998, Rose, 2000, Rajan, 2002, Fritz and 
Muhlich, 2006, and Agénor and Aizenman, 2008). According to these authors, the 
“trade-first” sequence lacks support in the experience of the countries’ trade strategies. 
Generally speaking, regional trade arrangement could encourage industrial 
specialization and inter-industry trade, which could increase similarity and symmetry in 
terms of supply and demand shocks with its partners.  
Second, gravity-based cross-sectional evidence indicates that belonging to a currency 
union more than triples trade with other members of the zone (Frankel and Rose, 2000).  
Moreover, every one percent increase in trade raises income per capita by roughly 1/3 
of a percent over twenty years. Simply put, the benefits of the currency unions for 
economic performance come through the promotion of trade, rather than through a 
commitment to non-inflationary monetary policy. 
Third, as properly pointed by Rajan (2002:3), practices like “competitive devaluations 
may generate a protectionist backlash which goes against the purpose of the regional 
trade arrangement and possibly even threatens its existence, as the recent experience of 
the Mercosur seems to suggest”.  
Ultimately, why could exchange rate coordination not precede regional trade 
arrangements? Why have currency union and regional trade arrangements not ever been 
established simultaneously? What really happened with the paradigmatic experience of 
the European Union? Did this experience really follow the “trade-first” conventional 
wisdom?  
In the process of arranging common currency, previous exchange rates parity alignment 
across the region’s economies wouldn’t be expected. The European Union shows how   7
broad the constellation of local currency parities against the US Dollar was.
2 As a 
benchmark, European Union was built under those conflicts. Some economies were 
relatively open (for example, Belgium’s openness ratio in the 1980s was near 70%), 
other ones were not (for example, Germany’s ratio was about 25%). Most economies 
allow the free movement of capital among member states in the aftermath of stable 
exchange rates. Actually, “the stability of the exchange rate encourages the member 
states to press forward” (Neal, 2007:103). It seems that conventional wisdom prescribes 
certain criteria for an optimum monetary union, but the practice indicates that when 
stable exchange rates are reached, member states are encouraged to step forward in 
eliminating several kinds of trade and financial restrictions.  Even the trade criteria 
(extension and diversification) are enhanced through lower trade costs, which are 
among of many benefits of belonging to regional trade and currency arrangements 
(Alesina and Barro, 2000)
3.   
III - LATIN AMERICAN EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES  
Latin America has had a wide variety of experiences with exchange rate regimes since 
the ‘80s – a decade in which the region experienced a major debt crisis and high rates of 
inflation. The spectrum goes from adoption of "hard pegs" (currency board, 
dollarization), to experiences with fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates or sliding bands, 
with these "soft pegs" ending up superseded by regimes with more flexible nominal 
adjustments of the exchange rate. The most common sequence begun with the adoption, 
at some moment, of either exchange rate "soft pegs" (fixed-but-adjustable rates, 
crawling bands) or "hard pegs" as a basis for inflation stabilization programs. Given 
residual rates of inflation – mostly from prices of non-tradable goods and services – and 
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the tendency to exchange rate over-appreciation as a result of the growth with foreign 
savings policy, the Dutch disease and exchange-rate populism cycles (Bresser-Pereira 
2008) overvaluation of local currencies usually took place. Loss of trade 
competitiveness often led to current-account deficits in the balance of payments, easily 
sustained by abundant capital flows to emerging markets in the first half of the ‘90s. 
Simultaneously, an excessive "dollarization of liabilities" tended to occur (both as unit-
of-account and as means of payment), as well as a corresponding currency (and often 
maturity) mismatch in portfolios, given declining perceived exchange-rate risks. 
After the ensuing balance-of-payments crisis in the 1990s and early 2000s – which 
tended to be more or less damaging depending on whether the pegs were “hard” (like 
the Argentinean currency board) or "soft”, like the Brazilian one – pegs were replaced 
by exchange rate fluctuation, usually after a period of overshooting of the local currency 
devaluation caused by the balance of payment crisis. Chile had the smoothest recent 
experience of change, replacing its band with a floating regime. In turn, Argentina's 
currency board was maintained during Mexico´s and Brazil´s soft peg exchange-rate 
regime upheavals, but it turned out to be unsustainable, sending Argentina into turmoil 
in the beginning of the 2000s and leading to a huge real and nominal depreciation of the 
Argentinean Peso. Since then, a deliberate policy to avoid re-appreciation of the Peso 
has met with success, while the Brazilian Real over-appreciates gradually from the 2002 
crisis up until 2008, when the world financial crisis emerged the Real suddenly 
depreciated.  
Table 1 illustrates how pegged exchange-rate regimes became widespread in Latin 
America until recently. With the exception of Panama, all hard pegged regimes 
disappeared. Therefore, the so-called "bipolar view" of surviving exchange rate regimes 
in emerging countries, according to which only extreme regimes are intertemporally 
sustainable when the emerging country is fully open to capital mobility (Eichengreen, 
1999) (Fischer, 2001), is not sustainable. In the 1990s, each of the major balance of 
payment crises in emerging economies involved some local sort of exchange-rate soft 
peg at corresponding core countries: Mexico (1994), Thailand, Indonesia and South 
Korea (1997), Russia and Brazil (1998), Argentina and Turkey (2000); the main cause 
of the crises, however, was not the exchange rate regime but the growth with foreign   9
savings policy adopted by many developing countries since the early 1990s and the 
ensuing major current account deficits that these economies faced in the pre-crisis 
moment. 
 
Table 1. Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin American Countries (1979-2008) 
1979 1982 1985  1988 1990  1991  1995  1998 2008 
Bolivia Ecuador  Guatemala  Ecuador  Haiti  Argentina  Argentina  Argentina   
Chile  El Salvador  Haiti  El Salvador Panama  Nicaragua  Brazil  Brazil   
Costa Rica  Guatemala  Nicaragua  Guatemala Dom.  Rep.  Panama  Panama  Panama
  Panama
 
Dom. Rep.  Haiti  Honduras  Haiti    Mexico      
Ecuador Honduras  Paraguay  Honduras           
El Salvador  Mexico  Peru  Nicaragua           
Guatemala Nicaragua Venezuela  Paraguay           
Haiti Panama  Panama  Panama           
Honduras Paraguay   Peru           
Nicaragua Dom.  Rep.    Venezuela          
Panama Venezuela               
Paraguay                
Venezuela                
Note: Both softly and hardly US$-pegged regimes (inc. dollarization).  
Source: IMF. EAER Annual Report. (Several Issues) 
 
It is true, though, that either one or the other policy tends to remain subordinated. An 
example comes from an IT framework in which direct and indirect instruments of 
intervention in foreign exchange markets are used as a complement to interest rate 
policy, in order to prevent exchange-rate hikes from passing through to inflation. Even 
when there is some (implicit and temporary) exchange rate level target, interventions 
aim at the inflation rate, not the other way around. 
The evidence is clear that Latin American countries moved from crawling and hard pegs 
to soft pegs or managed floating regimes, on the assumption that they are consistent 
with monetary policy and better able to cope with moderate balance of payment crises 
caused by the growth with foreign savings policy, loss of credit, and the consequent 
decision of foreign creditors to suspend debt roll-over. Crawling pegs and hard pegs 
were abandoned for managed floating, consistently with a relatively autonomous   10
monetary policy in a world of high capital mobility, practically rejecting either full hard 
pegs or full floating.  The advocates of passive monetary policies argue for "hard pegs", 
whereas those who are skeptical about the capability of the real side of Latin American 
economies to appropriately adjust to shocks tend to recommend (re)active monetary 
policies and passive (flexible) exchange rates, but in fact these countries are following a 
middle of the road alternative. 
Such a middle of the road alternative is a practical rejection of the “triangle of 
impossibility”, or the bipolar view. In fact, countries do not work on the sharp angles of 
the triangle. Instead, they rely on some combination of control of capital flows, 
monetary and exchange rate policy. This requires monetary authorities to play an active 
role in pushing ahead monetary and exchange rate policies. Critiques of this middle of 
the road alternative assume lack of monetary authority credibility to manage the 
exchange rate. This is just a prejudiced view. Balance of payment crises in Latin 
America were not a consequence of inability to manage the exchange rate, but of the 
recommended policy of growth with foreign savings (or current account deficits), or of 
using a nominal anchor to control inflation, or from “exchange rate populism”.
4  One 
must not forget, on the other hand, that this credibility will only be sustained once 
stabilization gains have been settled, and if the latter are followed by good performance 
in other macroeconomic criteria as well (such as growth, high employment, low default 
risks etc.). 
Frankel (1999) draws attention to various possible hypotheses of what tends to occur 
over time with respect to income-correlation as cross-border trade rises. The only 
unambiguous conclusion is that there is "no single regime right for all countries or at all 
times". In this respect, the difficulties exiting hard peg strategies should be taken into 
account. The Argentinean experience on this matter was quite remarkable.  
As concerns the current exchange-rate regimes in Latin American economies, at this 
point we propose the following intuitive observations: (i) there was a trend to switch 
from fixed to floating regimes, but there is nothing to allow any expectation that the 
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present managed-float configuration will remain as such in the future, or converge 
towards either one or the other ends of the continuum; (ii) current levels of foreign trade 
among the Southern neighbors are relatively large – and sectorally important enough to 
support currency pegging among them. At the same time, those levels are perhaps high 
enough to undermine national currency pegs to outside regions; and (iii) notably in the 
case of the Mercosur countries, OCA trade-based criteria adapted to Optimum 
Exchange-rate Regimes disregard some relevant financial dimensions of 
macroeconomic interdependence. Contagion and other neighborhood financial effects 
could turn their interdependence into a more significant fact than it may appear from a 
trade perspective. These are the points to be discussed next. 
Table 2 shows simple and important trade statistics for Argentina and Brazil. One of 
several criteria for ascertaining the feasibility of a common currency area relates to 
trade diversification, dissimilarity of commodity composition of production, and trade 
baskets. This is a fair concern, since monetary arrangements could be weakened on 
behalf of domestic monetary policy and even more flexible exchange rates as a means to 
face asymmetrical shocks in the region.  
Table 2 also shows that, on the one hand, Argentina is very well integrated with the 
region and Brazil shows a ample trade with the rest of the world, although all Latin-
American countries have an expressive share of Brazilian trade.  On the other hand, 
Brazil-Argentina trades are significantly synchronized with commodity prices (primary 
products), since the share of primary goods in total exports reach levels as high as 
almost 31% in Brazil and 44% in Argentina. However, according to OECD (2008), 
using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to assess trade concentration in Latin 
American economies, Brazil and Argentina show relatively low concentration levels in 
terms of both destination and product. The HHIs by products are 0.033 and 0.0493 for 
Brazil and Argentina, respectively
5.  
                                                 
5 The HHI by products averages 0.25 for the Latin American economies; Venezuela shows he highest 
HHI (0,776). HHI is a measure of concentration that takes into account the weighted average of each 
product and country. HHI ranges between zero and one; the higher the index, the more exports are 
concentrated in few products.   12
Therefore, even though the two economies show general differences in terms of 
international trade, they also present similarities in their trade patterns, implying 
relatively similar synchronism with the international business cycles. Their responses 
are just barely different during international shocks
6. 
 
Table 2. Argentina and Brazil: Trade Statistics (2007) 
   Brazil     Argentina    
   Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports 
in US$  197,942  173,197  55,780  44,707 
              
Partners (percent)             
     Euro Area  18.62  20.87  15.92  14.41 
     United States  17.98  16.26  8.69  12.58 
     Other LACs  15.3  8.36  22.16  8.32 
     Argentina  8.52  8.82   ---   --- 
     Brazil   ---   ---  17.3  34.4 
    China  6.1  8.75  7.53  9.14 
    Japan 
    Others 













              
Trade Specialization             
    Primary Products  30.6  19.04  43.97  6.02 
    Natural Resources Intensive Manufactures  23.59  18.5  25.12  15.2 
    Low Technology Intensive Manufactures  9.15  7.12  5.77  10.97 
    Medium Technology Intensive Manufactures  26.44  32.84  19.4  46.1 
    High Technology Intensive Manufactures 
    Others 













Note: Euro Area and Other LACs (Latin America and Caribbean Economies) include only countries with 
at least 0.5% share. 
Source: IMF. Directions of Trade Statistics on line and ECLAC. 
To summarize, over the last decade the major Latin American economies have moved 
away from fixed exchange rate regimes toward floating rates. Opposite solutions have 
also been adopted, such as hard pegging to US Dollar in Ecuador and El Salvador. 
However, allowing exchange rates to float was the way important LA economies found 
                                                 
6 During the financial crisis of 2008, it is undeniable that even the Euro Zone’s economy is strongly 
synchronized with the turmoil in the United States. It is not adoption of the Euro that intensified this, but 
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to deal with financial and currency crises. Since 2003, most important LA economies 
have converged to the same de facto flexible exchange rate arrangement and it is fair to 
ask if a common currency could work sooner for some of them. Some stylized facts can 
be considered to evaluate the feasibility of adopting a common currency in the 
Mercosur, and particularly between Brazil and Argentina. It is important to emphasize 
that exchange rate coordination in line with fluctuation bands should be considered as a 
first step in this direction.  
The facts are as follows. First, as the largest Mercosur economies have experienced 
floating exchange rate regimes, they have allowed exchange rate to float much more 
broadly than predicted. However, fluctuations do not delivery stability. In nominal 
terms, by 2008 the Argentina Peso had depreciated more than 100% relative to the 
currency board period (1991-2001), while the Brazilian Real is over-appreciated by 
more than 25% relative to the average of the full floating regime period (1999-2008), as 
seen in graph 1. In the aftermath of the currency crises, even though the parities are 
somewhat out of equilibrium, it would be fair to state that short-term monetary 
agreements between these two countries would help them reach exchange rate stability 
much faster. This is particularly true for Brazil, since, the Argentinean exchange rate 
has been stable in recent years.   
Actually, observing the real and effective exchange rates in both economies it’s fair to 
say that the parities are closer than might appear at a first glance. The Brazilian Real has 
depreciated because of the recent international financial crisis, showing that it was in 
fact over-appreciated. On the other hand, the Argentinean Peso would be more 
appreciated than figure 1 indicates if one were to consider private inflation surveys 
instead of the official index.  
Second, according to the selected macroeconomic indicators for selected Mersocur 
economies (table 4), far more similarities than differences exist. Inflation rates are the 
lowest ever seen; they are all relatively open economies, likely more convergent than 
European economies in the early stages of integration; the level of dollarization 
(deposits dollarization) in Argentina is no longer high. They are still marked by 
significant external vulnerability ratios. Exchange rates coordination could help deal 
with such vulnerability.   14
Third, graph 2 points out a very interesting role played by exchange rate stability. The 
intensity of trade between Brazil and Argentina only increased steadily when the 
exchange rate was relatively stable (1992-1998 and 2003-2007); otherwise, trade 
followed an unpredictable path. We are aware of the short duration and recent history of 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
It is conventional to associate an independent common currency with a suitable degree 
of economic integration so that “an independent common currency does not seem 
appropriate for Latin America because the necessary degree of political and economic 
integration is absent” (Berg et al., 2003:27). As we see it, a challenge for Mercosur 
region would be to coordinate their exchange rates in a kind of widely discussed and 
regularly evaluated fluctuation band. This would be a step subsequent to the adoption of 
floating regimes and would enhance trade and financial integration in the region. 
Moreover, this political decision would help economies stabilize their local currencies.  
How integrated are the Mercosur economies? Would increased trade and financial 
integration advance toward common currency? Would a peg to the US Dollar always 
mitigate cases of sudden exchange rate regime change (currency crises), exchange rate 
misalignment, high stock market volatility and financial turmoil? 
Other experiences, such as  the European Union’s, testify to the difficulties in achieving 
currency agreement as described by Neal (2007), who regards the European Economic 
Community’s (EEC) effort to achieve economic and monetary union as ambitious. In 
1970, following the Werner Report, the EEC proposed to achieve the common currency 
by 1980 in three stages. The first stage would comprise coordination of macroeconomic 
policies in order to narrow exchange rate fluctuations among member currencies to 
within a smaller range than authorized by the IMF (then still ± 1%).   
Regardless of the controversy as to whether a country should allow its currency to float, 
and how intensive should be such fluctuation, which exchange rate regime is better, or 
even when one economy should waive its own currency to adopt another’s, the 
cornerstone of this work lies in the fact that developing economies need to control their 
exchange rates. According to Bresser-Pereira (2009, chap.4) developing countries show 
a tendency to exchange rate over-valuation as a result of structural causes, principally   15
the Dutch disease and the appeal that the higher rates of profit and of interest in these 
countries have for foreign capitals. Markets do not make national currencies fluctuate 
around an equilibrium point as economic theory assumes; instead, they gradually 
appreciate until they cause balance of payment crisis, followed by a sudden stop and a 
sharp depreciation. Thus, regional agreements aside, developing countries are supposed 
to neutralize this tendency in order to avoid cyclical financial crises associated either 
with the growth with foreign savings policy or with exchange rate populism. For 
countries that aim to integrate, the adoption of coordinated macroeconomic policies and 
an exchange rate band with a single currency in mind helps the participants keep their 
currencies competitive because, with one currency tied to another, policymakers will be 
able to do their job more effectively: overvaluation will only happen if the policymakers 
in all the involved countries accept it. 
According to this approach, the central problems involved with the exchange rate are 
not choosing a regime – since the “float or fix” alternative is false –, or choosing 
between exchange rate volatility and exchange rate “misalignment”, but a specific form 
of volatility and misalignment: overvaluation leading to balance of payment crises. 
Recurring financial crises in these countries do not derive principally of fiscal problems 
and the twin deficits hypothesis but of the inability of many countries to neutralize the 
tendency to exchange rate over-valuation. Bresser, Gonzales and Lucinda (2009) 
demonstrated this claim by studying the financial crises of middle income countries in 
the 1990s and early 2000s.  
IV – EXCHANGE RATE COORDINATION IN PRACTICE IN MERCOSUR  
In the Mercosur the endogeneity issue and also the tendency towards exchange rate 
overvaluation set serious limitations to the prerequisites of optimum currency area 
conventional wisdom. Theoretical and practical shortcomings exist. On the other hand, 
both should be considered if the Mercosur countries, principally Brazil and Argentina, 
decide to engage in building a common currency area. Let us suppose that this decision 
is a way to overcome structural causes of exchange rate overvaluation tendency in the 
Mercosur insofar as the “trade-first” sequencing no longer works.   16
Let’s assume four important elements from a practical standpoint. First, that there is an 
initial level of the exchange rate in each economy, Argentina and Brazil, which could be 
considered reasonable. This is a difficult decision because the countries will have to 
consider (1) the relative ratio between the two currencies and (2) the initial level relative 
to a basket of other currencies. In this second decision, they should consider the Dutch 
disease that moderately but effectively plagues these countries. As an illustration, let’s 
assume that these two decisions for the two countries led to an initial 3.5 Argentinean 
Peso per American Dollar and 2.5 Brazilian Real per American Dollar. Second, that 
there is a band of fluctuation of about ± 2.5 percentage points, with those initial levels 
as the center of the band. These two devices are quite similar to the European snake. For 
the sake of simplicity, we assume only two economies: Argentina and Brazil
7. Some 
current statistics data may help us in our simulation. In 1999, Brazil implemented a 
floating exchange rate regime in the aftermath of the currency crises, while Argentina 
was still experiencing a pegged regime that it only dropped in 2001. From March 1999 
to July 2007, just before the international financial crises, Brazilian Real appreciated 
over 65 percent in terms of the Argentinean Peso; the monthly nominal appreciation 
was about 0.92 percent with ± 5.9 percent on standard
8. This is rather high appreciation 
for such a short period. However, from August 2007 to February 2009, the Brazilian 
Real devaluated about 54 percent in nominal terms. This means that most of the 
appreciation has been faded away recently. It seems that the relation between the two 
currencies has reached a reasonable level. 
Let us use a very simple illustration to depict some form of exchange rate coordination 
with Brazil and Argentina. First, a band of fluctuation could be established at the 
current parity, according to the ratio of 1 to 1.5; that is, with the Brazilian Real 
appreciated against Argentinean Peso. As the annual inflation rate differential is about 5 
percent and assuming purchasing power parity to keep the real exchange rate constant, 
in few years we could reach an exchange rate parity similar to the average of the 1999-
                                                 
7 As the monetary agreement develops, other regional economies could adopt similar exchange rate 
strategies. 
8 The basic statistics shown here are available upon request.   17
2003 period. In this simple exercise there is no productivity growth differential between 
the two economies. 
The above makes two simple assumptions: 1. annual inflation rates are 5% and 10% in 
Brazil and Argentina, respectively; and 2. no dynamic association exists between 
changes in exchange rate and inflation over time, so that an appreciating Peso could 
help reduce inflation rates in Argentina. Most likely, the depreciation of the Real against 
the Peso would have irrelevant effects for the Brazilian inflation rate.  
We now assume:  
1. annual inflation rates of 5% and 10% in Brazil and Argentina, respectively;  
2. disregarding periods of turmoil in both economies, such as data from November 2001 
to February 2003, so that the average nominal appreciation drops from 0.92% per month 
to 0.15% per month, and the standard deviation drops from 5.9% to 2.5% (figure 2);  
3. smooth depreciation of the Real against the Peso;  
4. using the ± one standard deviation of the no-turmoil data sample (i. e., 2.5%);  
5. medium-term target exchange rates within the band of fluctuation;  
6. the same productivity growth in the two economies;  
7. commitment to a common fiscal and monetary agenda; and  
8. commitment to common trade agreements.   
 
With these assumptions, the two economies agree on a  band of fluctuation in order to 
balance exchange rate parity distortion and achieve equilibrium in a few years. To be 
coordinated, the band of fluctuation could be similar to the variability of the exchange 
rate thus far, that is, ± 1 standard deviation (2.5 per cent) around the target. Each target 
could remain in force for about a couple of years, so as to announce only a few targets. 
This amount to a very flexible alternative means of dealing with exchange rate 
instability in the region, and an intermediate situation could be adopted.    18
This basic exercise can fairly show the suitability of adopting common exchange rate 
policies for the two largest Mercosur economies. There are, indeed, two different fronts 
for such procedures. First, coordinate exchange rates according to a band of fluctuation, 
using the current exchange rate parities and the center of the band. Second, a medium-
term agreement could be adopted in terms of a (soft) landing of the Real against the 
Peso according to moving target zones and ending in either a fixed target zone or a 
common currency.  
Similar to the experience of European snake
9 we are proposing an ambitious effort to 
achieve monetary and exchange rate stability in the Mercosur as a response not only to 
exchange rate misalignment and volatility, but also, and mainly, to structural problems 
like the region’s exchange rate over-valuation tendency. Stages of implementation are to 
be expected similarly to the European Monetary System’s and, more importantly, so are 
strategies to avoid such problems as an appreciation floor. The stability of the exchange 
rate in the region and the neutralization of the Dutch Disease will encourage the 
member states to press forward with shared plans and macroeconomic policies. 
V - FINAL REMARKS 
For more than half a century Latin American economies have been aiming at economic 
integration, but Mercosur has been the only case of success so far. Is success was 
essentially due to the fact that it involved the two largest Mercosur economies, Brazil 
and Argentina, which already had a sizable trade between them and similar levels of 
economic growth. After the agreement, trade substantially increased between the two 
nations. Yet, the limits to economic integration are narrow if the integrated countries 
lack a common currency, or, to begin with, a managed exchange rate band. 
Conventional economic literature on the subject rejects this possibility on the grounds 
that Latin American countries lack enough integration, similarity, and macroeconomic 
coordination. It uses the troubled experience of the region in the last thirty years to 
reach to such conclusion. By doing so, the literature fails to realize, first, that in the 
                                                 
9 According to Neal (2007:97), the snake was a “response to the acrimony generated over the realignment 
of the French and the West German currencies, which had been carried out bilaterally in 1969, the EEC 
launched an ambitious effort to achieve economic and monetary union”.    19
1980s the region – and particularly the two major Mercosur countries that were the 
object of our paper – experienced a major debt crisis that develop into economic 
stagnation and high inflation; second, that in the 1990s they were the subject of 
conventional orthodoxy’s experiments with exchange rate regimes (currency boards, 
exchange rate anchors); third, that they adopted the recommended growth with foreign 
savings policy that, together with the exchange rage regimes, caused over-appreciation 
of their respective currencies and major balance of payment crises.  
Yet, from the analysis developed here, one should not conclude that the first step to be 
adopted by the Mercosur countries – a band of exchange rate fluctuation – is an easy 
job. It is not. First, Brazil and Argentina in particular must come to an agreement 
concerning the initial ratio between their real exchange rates. Second, a higher degree of 
macroeconomic policy coordination will be clearly required. Contrary, however, to 
what the conventional literature says on this matter, there is no reason to believe that the 
two requirements cannot be met. This literature bases its assessment on the two 
countries’ recent past experience – one that was troubled by a major debt crisis followed 
by the adoption of misguided exchange rate policies. It is also based on a preconception 
that the governing capacity of Mercosur countries paralyzes economic integration – an 
integration that will only materialize when the countries involved reach a solid 
agreement on their real exchange rates. 
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 Graph 1. Real Effective Exchange Rate in Argentina and Brazil (1994-2007) - Jan 




































Source: Funcex and Ipea. Author’s calculations. 
Notes: Trade Argentina-Brazil = Total Export and Import between Argentina and Brazil (right scale); 
Exchange Rate Instability = variation (percent) of exchange rate Brazilian Real per Argentinean Peso (left 
scale). 
 Table 3. Argentina and Brazil: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators (1997-2007) 
 
Source: Moody’s Dataset. 
Notes: (1) Inflation Rates = Consumer Price Index % Dec-Dec; (2) Trade Openness = Sum of Exports 
and Imports of Goods and Services/GDP; (3) Dollarization Ratio = Total Foreign Currency Deposits in 
the Domestic Banking System/Total Deposits in the Domestic Banking System; (4) Dollarization 
Vulnerability Indicator = Total Foreign Currency Deposits in the Domestic Banking System/(Official 
Foreign Exchange Reserves + Foreign Assets of Domestic Banks); and (5) External Vulnerability 
Indicator = (Short-Term External Debt + Currently Maturing Long-Term External Debt + Total 
Nonresident Deposits Over One Year)/Official Foreign Exchange Reserves.  
Country/Indicators  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006 2007F
Inflation Rates 
Argentina  0.3 0.7 -1.8 -0.7 -1.5 41 3.7 6.1  12.3  10  9.5
Brazil  5.2 1.7 8.9 6 7.7 12.5 9.3 7.6  5.7  4.3  4
Trade Openness 
Argentina  23.3 23.3 21.3 22.4 21.7 40.5 39.2 43.4  43.7  46.4  46.9
Brazil  20.4 20.9 27.5 27.3 33.1 34.7 34.7 34.9  32  36.6  37.7
Dollarization Ratio 
Argentina  57.3 58.4 61.1 66.6 72.5 2.9 6.1 10.3  12.8  6,4  4,4
Brazil  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  0  0
Dollarization Vulnerability Indicator 
Argentina  92.2 101.8 112.1 122.6 213.2 4.4 10.4 16  15.6  NA NA
Brazil  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  NA NA
External Vulnerability Indicator 
Argentina  189.5 185 171.8 180.4 260 333.9 347.2 217.4 192.4 103.8  62.3
Brazil  117.5 105.3 206.2 182.1 164.9 144.5 117.2 104.6 144.4  73  53.9
Current Account Balance (US$ Bil.) 
Argentina  -12.13 -14.48 -11.95 -8.99 -3.29 8.69 8.04 3.3  5.44  4.32  2.91
Brazil  -30.45 -33.42 -25.33 -24.22 -23.21 -7.64 4.18 11.65 14.19  8  4